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II. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN THIS APPEAL IS THAT OF 
"CORRECTION OF ERROR" AND THERE IS NO DEFERENCE TO BE 
GIVEN TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCYf S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
STATUTE IN QUESTION 
The Appellee has argued that the standard of review for this 
appeal in the abuse of discretion standard pursuant to U.C.A. 63-
46b-16(4)(h)(i). This abuse of discretion standard applies where 
a statute delegates discretion to an administrative agency. The 
Appellee has cited to no authority in this case that the statute in 
question has delegated such discretion to the tax commission. 
Furthermore, the Appellee has not attempted to dispute the Utah 
Supreme Courtfs standard for review relating to the statutory 
construction in tax exemption cases on which the Appellant relies. 
See Chris & Dick's Lumber v. Tax Commission, 791 P.2d 511, 513-14 
(Utah 1990) ("In the usual case, questions of statutory construction 
are matters of law for the courts, and we rely on a fcorrection of 
error* standard of review, according no deference to an 
administrative agency's interpretation") . Based upon the forgoing, 
the standard of review in the present appeal is that of correction 
of error. 
Additionally, the Appellee has asserted that Utah Code Admin. 
P. R865-19-37S (1992) is somehow dispositive of the issue before 
this Court. This administrative rule does nothing more than 
rearrange the order of the operative words in the statute. To the 
extent that this administrative rule is attempting to interpret the 
statute, it is accorded no weight and is entitled to no deference. 
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See Chris & Dick's, supra. Since there is no evidence that the tax 
commission was given any discretion to interpret the statute at 
issue, an administrative rule that attempts to do so is ineffective 
for that purpose. 
B. IN APPLYING RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND PURPOSE OF THE TAX EXEMPTION 
IN QUESTION WAS TO EXEMPT ANY OXYGEN OR STOMA 
SUPPLIES PRESCRIBED BY A PHYSICIAN OR ADMINISTERED 
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF A PARAMEDIC, WHICH INCLUDES 
AN OXYGEN CONCENTRATOR 
1. Legislative intent and the purpose sought to be 
accomplished. 
The Appellee would have this Court abandon all rules of 
statutory construction because of the general rule that tax 
exemption statutes are to be construed against the taxpayer. This 
is not the law, and, of course, the Appellee has cited to no 
authority for this novel proposition. The Appellee^ proposed 
construction is unreasonable; "[s]trict construction, however, does 
not warrant unreasonable construction." Citv of Liberal v. Seward 
County, 802 P.2d 568, 571 (Kan. 1990). If the Appellee's position 
in this regard were the law, the Utah Supreme Court could not have 
reached the decision it did in Parson Asphalt Products v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 617 P.2d 397 (Utah 1980), which is outlined 
in the Appellantfs Brief. Thus, an analysis of the issue before 
the Court requires the use of the tools of statutory construction 
to properly ascertain the legislative intent concerning what 
constitutes exempted medicine. 
The primary issue before this Court is what the Utah State 
Legislature intended when it permitted a tax exemption for 
2 
medicine, which it defined as "any oxygen or stoma supplies 
prescribed by a physician or administered under the direction of a 
physician or paramedic." U.C.A. 59-12-102(4)(a)(iii)(emphasis 
supplied) . If the legislature had defined "medicine" as "oxygen or 
stoma supplies. . ." then the Appellee's interpretation of the 
statute would be more credible; but, the legislature chose to use 
the adjective any to modify "oxygen." This usage greatly expands 
and broadens the scope of what was intended to be included within 
the term "oxygen." Any is "an •uncompromising1 word to be 
considered broadly," Vvtar Associates v. City Annapolis, 483 A.2d 
1263, 1266, n. 4 (Md.Ct.App.1984), and it has been interpreted to 
mean "all." Winslow v. Morgan County Commissioners. 697 P.2d 1141, 
1142 (Colo.Ct.App. 1985). The Appellee's only response to these 
cases is to dismiss them because they do not involve tax 
exemptions, though no support is provided to justify the position 
that statutory construction cases are irrelevant to determine the 
legislative intent in a tax exemption case. 
Of all the cases interpreting the word "any," the case of 
State v. Caprio. 477 A.2d 67, 70 (R.I. 1984) is particularly 
instructive. In that case, the court provided an expansive 
interpretation of the word "any" and stated that the "very breadth 
of the term fany person1 defies the exclusion of any class of 
persons. That term is so broad as to require exclusion, not 
specific inclusion." Id. When the word "any" is used as a 
defining adjective, the word it describes becomes all-encompassing 
and as broad as that word can possibly be. In the case before this 
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court, "any oxygen. . ." becomes any and all types and kinds of 
oxygen is any form whatsoever, whether in a green, metal bottle or 
an oxygen concentrator, as long as it is prescribed or administered 
bv a physician. As is explained in State v. Caprio, supra, the 
term "any oxygen" "defies the exclusion of any class of [oxygen]." 
Id. In order for any type, kind or form of oxygen to be excluded 
pursuant to the exclusion, it must be separately and specifically 
excluded. 
The Utah legislature has chosen to exclude from the definition 
of medicine the following items: "(i) any auditory, prosthetic, 
ophthalmic, or ocular device or appliance; or (ii) any alcoholic 
beverage." U.C.A. 59-12-102(4)(b) (i)&(2) . However, the 
legislature did not attempt to limit the broad, all-encompassing 
definition of "any oxygen" in this limiting language. Using the 
tools of statutory construction to ascertain the legislative intent 
in this matter, it appears as though the legislature intended a 
broad, expansive interpretation of oxygen. The Appellee's flawed 
analysis of the issue before this Court becomes apparent when the 
Appellee attempts to explain why oxygen is excluded and why an 
oxygen concentrator would not be. In its brief, the Appellee 
argues that an oxygen concentrator is true to its name: It 
concentrates, but does not create oxygen. Appellee's Brief at 12-
13. Implicit in this argument is the fallacy that in order to fall 
within the "oxygen" tax exemption, the person seeking the exemption 
would have to "create" the oxygen. Under this creative 
interpretation, no one would ever be able to claim this exemption 
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rendering it a nullity because no one can "create" oxygen. 
The oxygen in the green cylindrical metal bottles, which the 
Appellee would agree is exempt, is nothing but concentrated oxygen 
stored until the patient needs some of the oxygen at which point a 
valve is turned on and the patient receives the concentrated 
oxygen. This is exempt. In a more efficient and less expensive 
process, a patient would have an oxygen concentrator instead of a 
green metal bottle next to him or her. When oxygen is needed, the 
patient would turn on the oxygen concentrator valve and the patient 
would receive concentrated oxygen, identical to that which would 
come out of the green metal bottle. Under both processes, the 
patient receives the same oxygen directly from a small device that 
might be sitting next to the patient, all of which is done and 
administered under the direction of a doctor or paramedic. These 
processes are almost identical and given the legislature's intent 
for a broad interpretation of "any oxygen," the Appellants oxygen 
concentrator also falls within the medicine exemption. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant has met its burden of establishing that an 
oxygen concentrator falls within the tax exemption of medicine 
within the tax exemption statute. An analysis of the medicine 
exemption under the Utah Sales Tax Act, applying accepted rules of 
statutory construction, compels the conclusion that the Legislature 
intended that such a device as the oxygen concentrator be covered 
under the "any oxygen and stoma supplies" exemption to the sales 
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tax act. Failure to permit such an exemption ignores reality and 
is nonsensical. The oxygen concentrator is a technological 
innovation that provides the same concentrated oxygen more 
efficiently and at less cost. Such a technological advance that 
provides oxygen to patients under the direction of a physician 
should be treated the same as traditional bottled oxygen, which is 
only a reflection of a reality that the two are virtually the same 
product. 
DATED this _/ day of April, 1993. 
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BLACKf STITH & ARGYLE 
Attorneys for Petitioner - Appellant 
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